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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Following a jury trial, Carl Pickens, Jr. was found guilty of rape, first degree
kidnapping, and assault with intent to commit a serious felony (rape). In addition, he
was determined to be a persistent violator of the law and, thus, was eligible for a
sentencing enhancement. At his sentencing hearing, Mr. Pickens received the following
concurrent sentences: for rape, life, with 35 years fixed; for first degree kidnapping, 25
years, all fixed; for assault with intent to commit a serious felony (rape), ten years, all
fixed; and, for being a persistent violator, life, with 45 years fixed.
Mr. Pickens appealed.

On appeal, he contends that:

(1) his conviction and

punishment for both the greater offense of rape, and the lesser-included offense of
assault with intent to commit a serious felony (rape), twice placed him in jeopardy for
the same offense and, therefore, violated both the United States and Idaho
Constitutions; and (2) allowing the prosecutor to present argument and evidence
implicating Mr. Pickens in certain prior bad acts was error because that evidence was
clearly inadmissible and highly prejudicial.
The State has conceded a double jeopardy violation and aggress with
Mr. Pickens that his conviction for assault with intent to commit a serious felony (rape)
should be vacated; however, it argues that there was no error in allowing the prosecutor
to present argument and evidence implicating Mr. Pickens in certain prior bad acts. The
purpose of this Reply Brief is to respond to the State's arguments on the latter issue.
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ISSUES
1.

Was Mr. Pickens twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense when he was
convicted and sentenced for both the greater offense of rape, and the lesserincluded offense of assault with intent to commit a serious felony (rape)?

2.

Was it error to permit the State to offer evidence and argument implicating
Mr. Pickens in certain prior bad acts, where that evidence was clearly
inadmissible and highly prejudicial to Mr. Pickens' defense?
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ARGUMENT

I.
Mr. Pickens Was Twice Put In Jeopardy For the Same Offense When He Was
Convicted Of. And Sentenced For. The Greater Offense Of Rape. As Well As The
Lesser-Included Offense Of Assault With Intent To Commit A Serious Felony (Rape)
Mr. Pickens argues that, because assault with intent to commit a serious felony
(rape) is a lesser-included offense of rape, his conviction and punishment for both
offenses violated his Constitutional right not to be placed in jeopardy for the same
offense twice. (Appellant's Brief, pp.8-14.) The State agrees with Mr. Pickens' position
on this issue. (Respondent's Brief, pp.12-17.) Accordingly, no further discussion of this
issue is necessary and Mr. Pickens urges this Court to vacate his conviction for assault
with intent to commit a serious felony (rape).

11.
The District Court Erred In Permitting The State To Offer Evidence And Argument
Implicating Mr. Pickens In Certain Prior Bad Acts Because That Evidence Was Clearly
Inadmissible And Highly Prejudicial To Mr. Pickens' Defense
A.

Introduction
During the opening statement phase of Mr. Pickens' trial, the prosecutor informed

the jury that it would hear evidence that, immediately after the alleged rape, Mr. Pickens
told a nearby witness that "[t]his time it's not my fault."
(emphasis added).)

(Tr. Vol. V, p.151, Ls.5-13

Later, during the State's presentation of its case-in-chief, two

witnesses testified that Mr. Pickens had, in fact, stated "this time it's not my fault." (See,
e.g., Tr. Vol. V, p.242, L.24 - p.244, L.4, p.416, Ls.1-7, p.416, Ls.14-22.)
On appeal, Mr. Pickens asserts two claims related to the arguments and
evidence concerning his alleged statement that "this time, it's not my fault": first, he
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contends that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by revealing the alleged quote to
the jury during her opening statement when she knew, or should have known, that that
quote was inadmissible because no prior notice had been given in accordance with

I.R.E. 404(b) (Appellant's Brief, pp.19-25); second, he asserts that the district court's
ruling as to the admissibility of such evidence was in error-both because the State
failed to provide prior notice of its intent to use the evidence (as is required under Rule
404(b)), and because the evidence is irrelevant or, if somewhat relevant, its probative
value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect (Appellant's Brief, pp.25-30).
In response, the State has focused primarily on Mr. Pickens' prosecutorial
misconduct claim, arguing that no misconduct occurred and, even if it did, it was
harmless; however, interspersed with the State's misconduct arguments are arguments
that could certainly be construed as applying Mr. Pickens' evidentiary claim.

(See

generally Respondent's Brief, pp.17-29.) For the reasons set forth below though, the

State's arguments are without merit and, as was argued in Mr. Pickens' Appellant's
Brief, the district court erred in permitting the State to offer evidence and argument
regarding Mr. Pickens' alleged statement that "this time it's not my fault."
B.

The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct When, During Her Opening Statement,
She Quoted Mr. Pickens As Saying That "This Time It's Not My Fault," Knowing
That The State Had Not Provided Any Notice Of Its Intent To Use Evidence Of
Prior Bad Acts
In its Respondent's Brief, the State offers a number of reasons why it believes

that Mr. Pickens' prosecutorial misconduct argument fails. It argues that that claim is
procedurally barred (Respondent's Brief, p.24); it claims that the prosecutor could not
have engaged in misconduct for highlighting evidence which she knew, or should have
known, was inadmissible under 1.R.E. 404(b) because, in fact, that evidence was not
4

inadmissible under I.RE. 404(b) because it did not even fall within the scope of Rule
404(b) (Respondent's Brief, pp.19, 20-23); it contends that, even if the evidence in
question was inadmissible under Rule 404(b), the prosecutor cannot be shown to have
engaged in misconduct because Mr. Pickens cannot prove that the prosecutor knew
that that evidence was inadmissible (Respondent's Brief, pp.25-26); and it argues that,
even if the prosecutor engaged in misconduct, that misconduct was harmless because,
in its view, Mr. Pickens surely would have been found guilty anyway (Respondent's
Brief, pp.27-29). As set forth below, none of these arguments have merit.
1.

Mr. Pickens' Prosecutorial Misconduct Claim Is Not Procedurally Barred

As noted, Mr. Pickens contends that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct for
highlighting evidence-allegations that Mr. Pickens had said "this time it's not my
fault"-in her opening statement, which she knew, or should have known, was
inadmissible under 1.R.E. 404(b) because the State had failed to provide Mr. Pickens
with prior notice of its intent to use such evidence at trial. With regard to this claim, the
State arguably seeks to interpose two procedurally bars to having the claim considered
on its merits.
a)

Mr. Pickens' Prosecutorial Misconduct Claim Was Preserved
Through An Adequate Objection

The State's primary (or, perhaps, it's only) procedural argument concerning
Mr. Pickens' prosecutorial misconduct claim is that this is a new claim that was never
raised below and, thus, cannot be a source of relief on appeal unless any misconduct
that is found is determined to rise to the level of fundamental error.
Brief, p.24.) The argument, however, is misplaced.
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(Respondent's

Following the State's opening statement, outside the presence of the jury,
Mr. Pickens's counsel moved for a mistrial based on the prosecutor's mention of the
alleged "this time it's not fault" comment in her opening. (Tr. Vol. V, p.161, Ls.21-22.)
He argued initially that that alleged statement "infers [sic] this has happened before. It's
improper character evidence. And it should have been disclosed as 404(b) that they
intend to use it, which they have not done. I don't know how to unring that bell .... "
(Tr. Vol. V, p.161, Ls.8-15.)

Moments later, he continued, arguing not only that the

implication of the alleged statement was that something similar had happened before,
and that the State's intent to offer evidence of that statement should have been
disclosed in advance of trial as was required under Rule 404(b), but that the matter
"should not have been brought up in the opening statement" and the prosecutor's doing
so was "improper." (Tr. Vol. V, p.163, Ls.6-17 (emphasis added).)
Clearly, the foregoing argument was sufficient to preserve Mr. Pickens'
prosecutorial misconduct claim for appeal without having to resort to the fundamental
error doctrine.

Although the State now attempts to characterize defense counsel's

argument as a "notice" objection, not an objection concerning the fact that the evidence
was inadmissible because of the lack of notice, or an objection to the prosecutor's
misconduct (Respondent's Brief, p.24), the State's characterization of defense counsel's
argument is patently meritless. First, by its very nature, an objection to a lack of notice
being provided under Rule 404(b) is a complaint that the evidence in question cannot,
therefore, be admitted under Rule 404(b). See I.R.E. 404(b) ("Evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts . . . may . . . be admissible ... provided that the prosecution in a
criminal case shall file and serve notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of
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any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.")

Second, in light of the fact that

defense counsel argued that the prosecutor's mention of the alleged "this time it's not
my fault" comment was "improper," it is apparent that his prosecutorial misconduct claim
is preserved.
b)

Mr. Pickens' Prosecutorial Misconduct Claim Was Not Waived Or
Forfeited

Although it does not actually present any argument asserting that Mr. Pickens'
prosecutorial misconduct claim was in any way waived or forfeited, the State repeatedly
points out (in a somewhat misleading manner) that the district court offered to provide
the jury with "a specific instruction" concerning the alleged "this time it's not my fault"
comment, but that Mr. Pickens did not avail himself of that instruction.

(See

Respondent's Brief, pp.18, 19.) Thus, the implication from the State is that Mr. Pickens
could have readily mitigated any prejudice owing to the "this time it's not my fault"
evidence, but he chose not to do so.
The reality, however, is that the "specific instruction" offered up by the district
court would not have mitigated Mr. Pickens' prejudice in the slightest.

As was

discussed in Mr. Pickens' Appellant's Brief, the district court was prepared to instruct the
jury that there is no claim that Mr. Pickens had been physically or sexually abusive

toward Ms. Ortiz in the past, thus implying that Mr. Pickens had been physically or
sexually abusive toward someone else. (See Appellant's Brief, p.17 & n.11, p.26 n.17.)
Of course, either way, the implication would have been the same: that Mr. Pickens has
a propensity to commit the type of crimes that he was charged with in this case. Thus,
the prejudice would have been the same either way.
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2.

The Prosecutorial Statements And Witness Testimony At Issue Clearly
Fall Within The Ambit Of Rule 404/b)

The State's primary argument in this case, it seems, is that the alleged "this time
it's not my fault" statement cannot reasonably be construed as evidence of a prior bad
act and, thus, does not fall within the ambit of I.RE. 404(b). (Respondent's Brief, pp.19,
20-23.) Of course, if the evidence in question does not fall within the scope of Rule
404(b), then the State was not required to provide pretrial notice of its intent to use that
evidence at trial and, certainly, the prosecutor could not have engaged in misconduct for
mentioning that evidence in her opening statement without having provided such pretrial
notice.
In arguing that the alleged "this time its not my fault" statement does not fall
within the reach of Rule 404(b), the State argues that that alleged statement is "vague,"
"confusing," and "non-descript," and, thus, there is no way a jury could have taken it to
have been a reference to a prior physical or sexual assault by Mr. Pickens.
(Respondent's Brief, pp.21-23.) Such an argument though, is belied by the evidence
itself. The quote attributed to Mr. Pickens is that "this time it's not my fault." The clear
import of this alleged statement is Mr. Pickens admitted that some other time it was his
fault. Thus, when the jury heard this argument and evidence, it would have undoubtedly
been left with the impression that whatever scuffle, fight, or argument that caused
Mr. Pickens' cousin to peek into Mr. Pickens' bedroom was similar to some other
incident, at some other time, where he had been at fault.

By definition, this is

"[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts," and, thus, it clearly falls within the scope of
Rule 404(b).
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3.

Even If Mr. Pickens Cannot Prove That The Prosecutor Actually Knew
That The Evidence She Was Highlighting In Her Opening Statement Was
Inadmissible Under Rule 404(b). She Certainly Should Have Known That
It Was Inadmissible

The State further argues that, even if evidence of the alleged "this time it's not my
fault" statement was inadmissible pursuant under Rule 404(b), Mr. Pickens nevertheless
failed to establish prosecutorial misconduct because he failed to prove that the
prosecutor knew it was inadmissible under Rule 404(b) when she highlighted it in her
opening statement. (Respondent's Brief, pp.25-26.) The crux of this argument is that,
because the district court ultimately determined that the alleged "this time it's not my
fault" statement was admissible, the prosecutor could not have known otherwise.
(Respondent's Brief, pp.25-26.)
There are two significant flaws with the State's argument. First, because we can

never know what the prosecutor actually knew, the relevant question ought to be what
she should have known. See Mattson v. Bryan, 92 Idaho 587,592,448 P.2d 201, 206
(1968) (implying that it is improper for counsel to highlight evidence that she does not
have "reasonable ground to believe" will be admissible). In other words, a prosecutor's
ignorance ought not to be an excuse for depriving the defendant of a fair trial and due
process of law. In this case, therefore, the prosecutor engaged in misconduct because
she certainly should have recognized that the "this time it's not my fault" statement was
evidence of another crime, wrong, or act under Rule 404(b), and, under Rule 404(b),
pretrial notice of the State's intent to use such evidence was strictly required.
Second, hindsight, i.e., whether the district court ultimately admitted the
evidence, ought not to be the guide in determining whether the prosecutor knew, or
should have known, that the evidence she was highlighting in her opening statement
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would be admissible. Indeed, if hindsight were the guide, a legal error by the district
court in admitting a certain piece of evidence would shield the prosecutor from scrutiny
of even the most egregious misconduct.
4.

The Prosecutor's Misconduct Was Not A "Harmless" Error

Finally, the State contends that even if the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by
referring to evidence which she knew, or should have known, was inadmissible, her
misconduct in this case was nevertheless harmless (such that Mr. Pickens is not
entitled to a new trial) because, in the State's view, Mr. Pickens is undoubtedly guilty.
(Respondent's

Brief,

pp.27-29.)

This

argument,

however,

evidences

a

misunderstanding of the harmless error standard.
In determining whether a constitutional error is harmless, the reviewing court
determines whether it appears, beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not
contribute to the jury's verdict. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). "To say
that an error did not contribute to the verdict is ... to find that error unimportant in
relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question, as revealed in
the record." Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 403 (1991). The issue is whether the jury
actually rested its verdict on evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, independently of the
inadmissible evidence. Id. at 404-05. "The inquiry, in other words, is not whether, in a
trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered,
but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to
the error." Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993) (emphasis added).
Applying the Chapman standard correctly, it is clear that the prosecutor's
misconduct was not harmless because, as was discussed at length in Mr. Pickens'
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opening brief, arguments and evidence implying that Mr. Pickens had been guilty of one
or more similar acts previously was highly prejudicial to Mr. Pickens, especially in light
of the fact that this entire case turned on the alleged victim's credibility and that alleged
victim had a powerful motive to lie. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.23-25.)
C.

The District Court Erred In Concluding That Evidence That Mr. Pickens Had Said
"This Time It's Not My Fault" Was Admissible
As noted, in addition to arguing that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by

referencing the alleged "this time it's not my fault" evidence in her opening, Mr. Pickens
also asserts that the district court's ruling as to the admissibility of such evidence was in
error-both because the State failed to provide prior notice of its intent to use the
evidence (as is required under Rule 404(b)), and because the evidence is irrelevant or,
if somewhat relevant, its probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial
effect.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.25-30.)

In its Respondent's Brief, the State does not

address this argument directly; however, as noted above, in arguing that the prosecutor
did not engage in misconduct by discussing the alleged "this time it's not my fault"
comment in her opening statement, the State does argue at some length that evidence
concerning that comment does not fall within the reach of Rule 404(b). (Respondent's
Brief, pp.19, 20-23.) Because the State's argument in this regard is thoroughly rebutted
above (see Part 11(8)(2), supra), no further response is necessary.
In addition, although it does not specifically argue that Mr. Pickens' evidentiary
claim is procedurally barred, the State does correctly observe that "Pickens' trial
counsel did not object to either Cynthia's or Rachel's testimony concerning Pickens'
'this time' comment . . . . " (Respondent's Brief, p.19.)

Insofar as this observation

constitutes an invitation for this Court to hold that any claim of error in the district court's
11

admission of this evidence was waived through defense counsel's failure to object, that
invitation ought to be declined.

As was pointed out in Mr. Pickens' opening brief

(Appellant's Brief, pp.25-26), and as the State concedes (Respondent's Brief, p.25), in
denying Mr. Pickens' motion for a mistrial, the district court implicitly ruled that evidence
of Mr. Pickens' alleged "this time it's not my fault" comment was admissible. Since the
district court ruled on that precise issue, it is properly before this Court on appeal, even
in the absence of a contemporaneous objection to the State's proffered testimony. See
State v. Duvall, 131 Idaho 550, 553, 961 P.2d 641, 644 (1998) ("This Court has held
that ordinarily issues cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. . . . An exception to
this rule, however, has been applied by this Court where the issue was argued to or
decided by the trial court."); cf. State v. Hester, 114 Idaho 688, 699, 760 P.2d 27, 38
(1988) (holding that where there has been a pretrial ruling on the admissibility of a piece
of evidence, the opponent of that evidence "need not repeat his objection when the
evidence is offered during the trial").
Finally, insofar as the State argues that, even if the district court erred in allowing
the State to offer evidence of Mr. Pickens' alleged statement that "this time it's not my
fault," that error is harmless (see respondent's Brief, pp.27-29), that argument fails for
the same reasons articulated above. (See Part 11(8)(4), supra.)
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, as well as in Mr. Pickens' Appellant's Brief,
Mr. Pickens respectfully requests that this Court vacate his convictions and sentences,
and remand his case for a new trial on the rape and kidnapping charges or, in the
alternative, that it vacate his conviction and sentence for assault with the intent to
commit a serious felony (rape).
DATED this 30th day of October, 2009.

~~

ERIK R. LEHTINEN
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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